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The paper aims at investigating the structural change implications of
outsourcing. In trying to bridge the organizational/industrial and the
sectoral/structural analysis of outsourcing, it discusses the rational and
the methodological pros and cons of a “battery” of outsourcing measure-
ments for structural change analysis. Their functioning is then illustrated
through a concise application of them to the OECD area over the ’80s and
the early ’90s. A combined used of them emerges as recommendable in
checking for the role of outsourcing with respect to that of other structural
change determinants.
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1 Introduction
Outsourcing has recently become a “hot-topic” of several economic disciplines
dealing with the firm, such as industrial organization, labour microeconomics,
industrial relations and operation management, just to mention a few.1 Ac-
cordingly, cases for and against outsourcing are numerous and heterogeneous,
depending on the specific approach which is adopted.
This upsurging interest for outsourcing processes at the firm level has also
had an important cross-disciplinary fertilization. For example, a “new” strand
of trade theories has developed on the basis of its “fragmentation” effects (e.g.
Kohler, 2004; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001). Quite surprisingly, instead, the
new wave of outsourcing studies has not been accompanied by an as enthusiastic
revival of one of the economic fields which for first recognized its relevance: that
is, structural change analysis.
More than 20 years ago already, Momigliano and Siniscalco (1982b), among
others at that time (e.g. Stanback, 1979; Ginzberg and Vojta, 1981; Gershuny
and Miles, 1983), recognized that the externalization of production activities
from manufacturing firms to specialized producers of business services repre-
sented, also and above all, a change in the relative weight of the sectors of an
economic system, in terms of both production output and employment. But,
despite these seminal contributions, the structural change implications of service
outsourcing have remained since then relatively neglected. On the one hand,
the increasing availability of firm micro-data and the extraordinary development
of firm surveying techniques have made the analysis of its impact on the firm
boundaries dominant with respect to that on the boundaries of manufacturing
sectors. On the other hand, the reference to the “establishment” as the unit of
analysis for building up input-output tables has marginalized its interpretative
role of a phenomenon which is claimed to occur at the firm level.
This is unfortunate, as the role of service outsourcing in explaining the struc-
tural change of economic systems is quite apparent. Indeed, the externalization
of business services undertaken by manufacturing firms, while (or rather than)
decreasing the industrialization degree of one economy, determines a reshaping
of the sectoral boundaries between manufacturing and (business) services.
However, quite recently, the increasing pervasiveness of outsourcing has
spurred some researchers to reconsider the role that, along with technologi-
cal change and changes in demand, the kind of organizational change entailed
by outsourcing has had on the economic restructuring of developed countries
(Dietrich, 1999; McCarthy and Anagnostou, 2004). More precisely, these stud-
ies have tried to “decompose” the changes occurred over time in input-output
tables data, with the aim of disentangling the relative weight of demand-side
and supply-side factors in driving economic restructuring. In fact, these stud-
ies generally conclude that the “deindustrialization” arguments that have been
used, for example, in accounting for the economic restructuring of Europe from
the ’70s to the ’90s, have largely overlooked the extent of outsourcing processes.
In so doing, they add, conventional economic views would have underestimated
the actual importance and contribution of manufacturing to GDP.
In trying to get rid of such a bias, these studies attempt to bridge the
1For a critical survey of the different industrial approaches to national and international
outsourcing see Spencer (2005). For a more general account of the issue in economics see
instead Montresor et al. (2006).
2
industrial analysis of outsourcing with the intersectoral one of structural change.
More precisely, they propose to refer to some sectoral “proxy” of outsourcing
to be used along with sectoral proxies of other demand and supply factors of
structural change, and to deal with them simultaneously.
This paper tries to analyze this conceptual bridge from a methodological
point of view. At the outset, it discusses its inspiring rational more in depth,
along with its theoretical background (Section 2). The methodological problems
which emerge in the bridging are then spelled out (Section 3). At first, a battery
of indicators is surveyed which could be used to detect traces of outsourcing in
what could be otherwise considered “simple” tertiarization (Section 4). Their
functioning and interpretative power is then showed through an illustrative and
concise empirical application to a set of OECD countries along the ’80s and the
’90s (Section 5). Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
In organization economics outsourcing is usually dealt with under the “firm-
boundaries” agenda. Indeed, it is considered as a process symmetric to the
integration one,2 through which the “vertical scope” of the firm shrinks rather
than enlarging. Either because some transactions are “moved” from the firm
to the market governance mechanism – following transaction cost economics –
or because monitoring costs are such to make external principal-agent relation-
ships more effective – following incomplete contract theories – or because some
activities are better carried out through external rather than internal resources
and competences – following the resource-based view (Montresor et al., 2006).
Associating outsourcing to just a shrink of the firm boundaries could however
be contrasted by looking at the firm as an “open system”, whose boundaries in-
tegration and outsourcing would rather make, respectively, less and more “per-
meable” to other organizations and, more in general, to market mechanisms
(Jacobides and Billinger, 2005). Indeed, some have argued that outsourcing,
through the partnerships, collaborations and agreements which it often entails,
would have stimulated the firms to become “extended enterprises” (McCarthy
and Anagnostou, 2004) or, similarly, “network firms” (Antonelli, 1988).
Sticking to one or the other interpretation has important implications on
the nature of the shifts that outsourcing determines in the boundaries of those
sectors in which the relevant firms operate. Using a more accurate jargon,
outsourcing turns out to have in the two cases different structural change im-
plications. The fact that, for example, a textile firm outsources its machinery
maintenance to a specialised service firm, according to the first interpretation
just alters, namely diminishes, its economic contribution to manufacturing and,
in turn, the economic contribution of manufacturing to the economic system:
putting it simply, service outsourcing would induce nothing but a “tertiariza-
tion” effect. Following the second interpretation, however, the same outsourcing
2For this reason, it is often referred to simply as “disintegration” or “externalization”.
To be sure, in some economic disciplines, namely in business economics, outsourcing is dis-
tinguished from other externalization processes of the firm by looking at, for example, the
nature and the characteristics of the underlying obligations, the strategic value of the assets
involved, etc. In the present paper however, at the risk of being somehow inaccurate, we will
treat externalization, disintegration and outsourcing as synonymous.
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operation would rather entail a restructuring of the textile sector, and of manu-
facturing in general, following which its contribution to the economic system is
actually changed in nature rather than simply diminished. As Momigliano and
Siniscalco (1982b) put it, much of what is called tertiarization should be better
called integration of services in manufacturing or, possibly, of some manufac-
turing activities in other manufacturing activities.
In the light of the increasing resort that firms make to outsourcing strate-
gies, capturing this particular kind of structural change, often amounting to an
extension of manufacturing sectors into non-manufacturing sectors, has become
extremely urgent. And as urgent has become the need of disentangling the role
of outsourcing in explaining the deep structural changes that most of the devel-
oped economies have undergone over the last twenty years. The next sections of
the paper aim to move in this direction, by debating some methodological issues
(Section 3) and tools of analysis (Section 4), and by presenting some illustrative
empirical evidences (Section 5).
3 Outsourcing and sectoral input-output rela-
tions
In industrial organization, outsourcing is usually retained a process through
which a certain firm “switches” from making a certain activity of its production
process in-house to buying its outcome from an external contractor, typically
another firm (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). Empirical evidences shows that
increasingly more this switch occurs for those activities which are not part of
the “core competences” of the firm, but rather ancillary ones, externalized to
specialized suppliers of other industries: janitorial services and ICT are the most
notable example (Abraham and Taylor, 1996). In these and other similar cases,
on principle, one would expect that outsourcing, by involving an intersectoral
relation, gets somehow reflected into a correspondent change in the relevant
input-output table, which of such a kind of relations represents an increasingly
more accurate map. In the following, we will refer to it as “intersectoral out-
sourcing”.
Conversely, when firms outsource parts of their production process itself -
for example by contracting out the transformation of a certain intermediate
input - the evidence of a change at the input-output level will presumably be
less visible, as it amounts to an “intrasectoral outsourcing” relation, rather than
an intersectoral one. Still, a certain correspondence between the two levels of
analysis - that is, the firm and the sector level - could be looked for.
However, such a correspondence is just a spurious one, mainly for two
methodological problems. The first one has to do with the unit of analysis
for the construction of input-output tables.3 Indeed, input-output tables are
built up by measuring and adding, sector by sector, the deliveries of goods and
services which occur between different “establishments”, rather than between
different firms, or enterprises, as such. In other words, the so-called “inter-
establishment deliveries” – that is, deliveries of goods and services between
3In general, intersectoral studies of outsourcing are quite “cavalier” on this point. In Tucker
and Wilder (1977), Domberger (1998), Dietrich (1999) and McCarthy and Anagnostou (2004)
for example, such a crucial issue is not even mentioned.
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establishments belonging to the same enterprise – are also accounted as total
output of the production unit and thus recorded as either intermediate con-
sumption or gross fixed capital formation by the receiving unit. Apparently,
this would represent a serious obstacle in detecting outsourcing starting from
input-output tables. Indeed, “data aggregation methods which assign various
plants of a single company to different industries in effect ignore multi plant
ownership and therefore result in data which are insensitive to major forms of
vertical integration” (Woodrow Eckard, 1979, p.105): the comment, raised in
an old but effective note on the empirical measurement of vertical integration,
actually also applies to vertical disintegration.
The insensitivity of input-output tables to outsourcing is however not to-
tal and rather depends on the specific case. At the outset, the sensitivity is
quite high in front of those outsourcing processes which occur when a certain
establishment substitutes services and/or intermediate inputs provided by an
establishment of a different firm, for those previously produced within the es-
tablishment itself (“pure outsourcing”). This happens, for instance, when a
firm decides to outsource the janitorial services previously performed within
each establishment to an external specialized service provider.
The sensitivity is definitively lower when services and intermediate inputs
were previously provided to a certain establishment by another establishment of
the same firm: indeed, the substitution, for the latter, of an establishment be-
longing to a different firm, could virtually leave the correspondent input-output
deliveries unchanged but, it should be stressed, just in quantitative terms. In-
deed, in terms of value, the substitution would certainly find an input-output
manifestation because of the substitution of market prices for “internal prices”
in evaluating the outsourced transaction. Such a transaction actually becomes
more “permeable” to market mechanisms. One could think of a firm in the
automobile industry that closes down a plant producing shock absorbers and
starts buying them from specialized suppliers or sub-contractors. This is also
the case of a firm which spins off one of its divisions.
A last case could instead generate a sort of “over-sensitivity”, rather than
insensitivity, of input-output tables to outsourcing. Such as when a certain
firm creates, ex-novo, a new establishment for the provision of certain services
and/or intermediate inputs to another existing establishment of its own. This
could be the case of a firm establishing a plant for the internal provision of IT
services, and such services were previously provided within each establishment
of the firm, without involving inter-establishment deliveries.
Although it is certainly true that this difference in the unit of analysis poses
some problems, it has to be noted that, if one deals with service outsourcing, as
we actually do in the present paper, such a difference is not so crucial. Indeed,
because of the particular nature of the output of such activities, that is neither
storable nor transportable, the most frequent situation is probably the one in
which, prior to outsourcing, services are provided within each establishment.
One might think of janitorial or cleaning services. Firms do not usually set up
separate establishments for the “in-house” provision of such services. In fact,
implementing what is usually called an Activity-Based Costing and Management
(ABCM), and thus keeping service costs under control, is usually one of the
reasons for firms to outsource service provision.4
4As pointed out by Domberger, “many private sector organizations, and most public sector
5
However, it is also true that one should not exclude that, instead of resorting
to outsourcing, firms could set up a separate establishment for the provision of
such services. This is the case of over-sensitivity of input-output data already
stressed: although, strictly speaking, this does not represent a case of outsourc-
ing as such, changes in input-output relationships could assimilate it to other
more proper cases of it. Notwithstanding, also in the light of its limited extent,
accounting it as a special (and indeed “odd”) case of inter-firm outsourcing does
not appear totally misleading with respect to the inner rational of the process.
Indeed, inter-establishment transactions, even if within the same firm, are more
transparent than intra-establishment ones.
The second methodological limitation of an intersectoral analysis of out-
sourcing by means of input-output tables has to do with what is referred to
as international “fragmentation” (e.g. Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001) and the
distinction between its two main channels: international delocalization and in-
ternational outsourcing. The former is intended as the set-up of a plant in a
foreign country by a domestic firm, whereas the latter usually refers to a situ-
ation in which firms contract out parts of their production process to foreign
firms.5 Indeed, although phenomena of international fragmentation can be de-
tected by referring to input-output tables of imported flows, it is not possible to
distinguish at which extent it is due to delocalization rather than international
outsourcing.6 One again, although relevant, this problem is not so crucial for
empirical applications, such as the present one, which intend to capture, rather
than the international division of labour, the influence of outsourcing on the
sectoral boundaries of an economy.
With these caveats in mind, in the following we discuss a “battery” of input-
output indicators of outsourcing, at different levels of analysis (e.g. sectoral and
subsystem) and with different interpretative power (e.g. direct and indirect).
4 Outsourcing measurements for structural change
analysis
Once outsourcing has been meant as a structural change determinant, possibly
substitutive or complementary with respect to other determinants at the sectoral
level (such as industrialization and deindustrialization), identifying a consistent
sectoral measurement for it becomes necessary, although problematic.
ones, cannot account for their internal costs of service provision on a disaggregated basis, that
is, in terms of individual service” (Domberger, 1998, p.47).
5To be sure, there is no clear definition of international outsourcing. Indeed, while some-
one uses the term as a synonym of international fragmentation, measuring it as the ratio of
imported intermediate inputs to the total value of domestic production (e.g. Feenstra and
Hanson, 1999; Glass, 2004; Jones et al., 2005), someone else instead refers to “international
partnerships” (e.g. Van Long, 2005), thus assuming a minimum level of relationship durability
among the transactors.
6Input-output tables have been widely used in studies on international outsourcing in
manufacturing sectors. In these works international outsourcing is measured as the ratio of
imported to domestic intermediate inputs of each sector (Campa and Goldberg, 1997; Feenstra,
1998; Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). Another recent study by Hummels et al. (1998) deals with
the issue of the actual complementarity between international production and international
trade due to the increasingly important role played by vertical specialization. They use input-
output data to calculate for each sector the amount of imported inputs embodied in exported
goods.
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Indeed, because of the problems related to the unit of analysis (discussed
in Section 3), such measurements cannot be taken for more than outsourcing
proxies. Their interpretative power is however different, as we will show in the
following.
4.1 The sectoral indicators of service outsourcing
The most straightforward way to capture the amount of service outsourcing
made by the firms belonging to a certain manufacturing sector is, of course,
looking at the correspondent intersectoral flows from the relevant input-output
table. For instance, we could analyze the changes occurred over time in the inter-
mediate business service transactions at constant prices (SERV ) made by man-
ufacturing firms per unit of production (Q), that is, for sector i: ∆(SERVi/Qi),
where a positive variation could be a signal of outsourcing.
Although the most direct indicator, in using it we have to implicitly assume
two hypotheses. First of all, returns to scale should be held constant, referring
to a common but quite problematic assumption in input-output analysis of
structural change. Second, we have to assume that technological progress does
not significantly affect service technical coefficients in manufacturing sectors.
In particular, if we are interested in cross-sectional structural comparisons, we
should retain that this effect is the same across the compared countries.
Moreover, given that the present indicator is based on nothing but an input-
output coefficient, we should also discount the fact that a change of it might be
even provoked by cases of “intrasectoral outsourcing”. Indeed, as we will clarify
in the next section, this kind of outsourcing might decrease SERVi/Qi via an
increase of the gross production of sector i itself.
In trying to overcome these problems, one might want to use an alternative
indicator of service outsourcing, suggested by McFetridge and Smith (1988),
that is: the change in the ratio between the intermediate business service trans-
actions of a certain sector i (SERVi) and the value of wages and salaries of
the same sector (LABRi): ∆(SERVi/LABRi). Indeed, as we will also argue
in what follows, outsourcing usually implies a substitution of primary inputs,
mainly labour, for intermediate inputs, so that a positive variation of the pre-
vious ratio could be signaling service outsourcing.
However, also to use this measure as an indicator of outsourcing we have to
make an important implicit assumption: the price of business services in wage-
units have to be stable over time. In making cross-section comparisons, for
example, we have to assume a constant relative cost of labour across countries,
an assumption which hardly holds true for economic systems with different levels
of development. Moreover, the same indicator tends to vary, and thus become
less reliable, whenever a change in the labour productivity of a certain sector is
not properly reflected in the correspondent monetary wages.
Thus, also the present indicator, as the previous one, is just an imperfect
indicator of service outsourcing at sectoral level. Both of them are affected by
different phenomena, not all related to outsourcing. However, the “noise” by
which they are affected can be deemed as less problematic when, and if, they
both signal traces of outsourcing, while contrasting signals would recommend
caution.
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4.2 The input-output technical coefficients
The effects that outsourcing brings about at sectoral level are not just lim-
ited to the direct ones associated to an increase of SERVi/Qi. More in gen-
eral, through any kind of outsourcing, intra-firm transactions, or better to say,
“intra-establishment deliveries”, which cannot be caught by national accounts
and input-output data, actually shift outside the firm (the establishment) and
thus become measurable by them. In other words, by shifting the boundaries of a
certain establishment, outsourcing brings about an increase in the intermediate
consumptions of the sector to which it belongs, which comes from organizational
changes, and not from technological ones. More precisely, through this mech-
anism outsourcing affects the intermediate consumption, the total production
and the value added of the sectors in which it occurs.
Of course, these effects are different depending on the sectoral classification
of the establishments themselves. In what we called “intrasectoral outsourc-
ing”, the “outsourcee” and the “outsourcer” belong to the same sector: ceteris
paribus, we can view outsourcing as increasing the intermediate consumption
and the gross output of the same sector, while leaving its value added hardly
affected. In what we called “intersectoral outsourcing”, on the contrary, out-
sourcing involves units of production belonging to different sectors, such as in
the case of producer services analyzed in the previous section: ceteris paribus, in
the “outsourcer” sector, because of outsourcing, gross production can be viewed
as unchanged, while its value added diminishes.
At the outset, these effects determine a change in the relevant input-output
coefficients, that is in the correspondent elements aij of matrix A defined as:
A =W qˆ−1 (1)
where qˆ andW stand for, respectively, the diagonalized vector of sectoral gross
production and the matrix of intersectoral production flows.
And these changes can be read accordingly. When in a certain sector j
there are evidences of “intrasectoral outsourcing” processes, its gross output
(Qj) increases, because the correspondent intrasectoral inflows (wjj) increase
for accounting reasons. On the other hand, the inflows out of the main diagonal
(wij with i 6= j) do not change. For this reason, outsourcing determines, first of
all, a reduction in the extra-diagonal technical coefficients for sector j, that is,
aij (with i 6= j). In addition, as the sectoral value added, which is not affected
by duplication, remains unchanged, the increase of wjj turns out to be greater
than that of Qj , because Qj is the sum of all the intermediate inflows plus the
value added of the sector. Accordingly, outsourcing also makes the technical
autocoefficients ajj increase. Summing up, “intrasectoral outsourcing” in a
certain sector j might be expected to determine a reduction in the technical
coefficients aij (with i 6= j) and an increase in the technical coefficient ajj . Let
us stress that this is due just to accounting reasons, not related to the production
side (for a formal treatment see Appendix A).
These effects do not occur, instead, in the case of “intersectoral outsourc-
ing”, because the gross output of the “outsourcer” sector remains relatively
stable. Therefore, disentangling organizational changes from technological ones
becomes in this case nearly impossible. Additional information could however
be obtained by looking at an important related sectoral ratio to which we will
now turn.
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4.3 The ratio between sectoral value added and gross pro-
duction
As we said in the previous section, outsourcing affects sectoral intermediate
consumption, gross output and value-added, and these effects are different de-
pending on the sectoral classification of the firms involved. In addition to a
change in terms of input-output coefficients, outsourcing could also be expected
to bring about a lower value added-gross production ratio in the sector of the
outsourcer firm.
Indeed, this is a common idea in measuring the opposite phenomenon, as
the value added-sales ratio has been quite often taken for a measure of vertical
integration of both firms and sectors in industrial economics.7 Although quite
common, however, in using it one should be aware of the fact that the value
added-gross production ratio is affected by cyclical effects as well as sectoral
crises. Indeed, being Qi ≡ V Ai+Mi, where Qi, V Ai and Mi stand for, respec-
tively, the gross production, the value added and the intermediate consumptions
of a certain sector i, the derivative of V Ai/Qi with respect to V Ai is:
∂
∂V Ai
V Ai
Qi
=
Mi
Q2i
(> 0).
Therefore, whenever there is a reduction in V Ai, with a constant Mi, V Ai/Qi
diminishes. And the same ratio decreases also when the rate of decrease of V Ai
is greater than the rate of decrease ofMi, as it usually happens in sectoral crises,
due to demand slowdowns. Indeed, whenever gMi > gV Ai, where gx stands for
the rate of change of x, we have that:
gV Ai/Qi = gV Ai− gQi = gV Ai−
(
Mi
Qi
gMi +
V Ai
Qi
gV Ai
)
=
Mi
Qi
(gV Ai− gMi) < 0.
In order to discount, at least to a certain extent, these last factors, it is how-
ever possible to use average values of the same sectoral ratio over a sufficiently
long period.8 Although with some arbitrariness, due to the identification of the
extent of this period, average V A/Q sectoral ratios can be retained as indicators
of sectoral vertical integration/disintegration, with important elements of com-
plementarity with respect to the other analyzed indicators. In particular, with
respect to an indicator that we will present in the next section, once we will
have moved from a sectoral level of analysis, retained up to now, to a subsystem
level of analysis.
It should be noted also that some economists have argued that such an
indicator should just be used in intertemporal analyses, but not in cross-sectional
comparisons, being biased by the fact that the index ‘will be higher the closer
the firm in question is to the raw materials source of the production chain’
(Tucker and Wilder, 1977, p.83).
7The value added-sales ratio as a measure of vertical integration was firstly proposed by
Stigler (1951) and then utilized in a seminal article by Adelman (1955). It was then used
in a number of empirical studies for testing the shifts over time of vertical integration in
manufacturing (e.g. Laffer, 1969; Tucker and Wilder, 1977).
8To get rid of trends in profitability, Tucker and Wilder (1977) construct instead an alterna-
tive index, defined as (V A−Net income−Income taxes)/(Q−Net income −Income taxes).
However, due to data availability, using this index usually shrinks the coverage of the set a
lot.
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Figure 1: Examples of intersectoral linkages
The previous statement is however not guaranteed, and holds true just by
assuming vertically integrated models of production, which quite often under-
value horizontal linkages among sectors.9 Indeed, thinking about an economic
system as a “production chain” means regarding sectors as “boxes” put along
an ideal line, moving from raw materials toward finished goods, in which there
is a unique ranking of sectors resulting from their “proximity to raw materials”.
If such a ranking existed, then it would be true that the closer the sector firms
belong to is to raw materials, the higher its value added will be compared with
its gross production.10
However, if intersectoral linkages creates cycles among sectors, as it actually
occurs, there is no ranking in terms of proximity to raw materials according to
which sectors can be classified. More precisely, and using terms coming from
graph theory, we could say that, if intersectoral linkages are such that sectors
belong to one strong component, no ranking can be specified (Diestel, 2005).
In order to give an example, Figure 1 shows four possible patterns of linkages
among sectors in a simple three sectors economic system. As shown by the
Figure, in case (a) and (b) it is possible to rank the sectors. Indeed, in case
(a) from sector a one can move toward the remaining sectors, but the sector
itself cannot be reached starting from one of the other two; from sector b one
can reach only sector c; from sector c it is not possible to go anywhere else.
Therefore in such a case the sectors are ranked as follows: 1 − (a), 2 − (b),
3− (c). Also in case (b) there is a ranking. Indeed, while from sector a one can
reach the remaining two, there is no way toward sector a starting from b or c.
Accordingly, the ranking is: 1−(a), 2−(b, c). On the contrary, in the remaining
9For a discussion on vertically and horizontally integrated models of production see
Baranzini and Scazzieri (1990)
10E.g., let us suppose there are only three sectors in the economy, each adding a value of 100.
If sector a produces its own output using just labour and non produced means of production,
sector b utilizes sector a’s output as an input and the same does sector c with sector b’s output
to eventually deliver its products to final demand, the value added-sales ratios of the three
sectors will be as follows:
V Aa
Qa
=
100
100
= 1;
V Ab
Qb
=
100
200
= 0.5;
V Ac
Qc
=
100
300
= 0.3.
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two cases ((c) and (d)), one can reach each sector starting from each other and
no ranking can be therefore specified.
Strictly speaking, for having a ranking among sectors, the input-output coef-
ficients matrix of an economic system should be decomposable, that is, reducible
through elementary operations to a block triangular matrix; a condition which
is rarely fulfilled. However, there could be sectors in which vertical linkages be-
tween different production processes are more prominent than horizontal ones,
and the former still determine a bias when value added-gross production ratios
are used. Notwithstanding, it is also true that, while this could be the case
when a manufacturing sector is compared with an agricultural one, it is not
probably so when the comparison is between two manufacturing sectors. In-
deed, in the latter case horizontal linkages are far more important than vertical
ones. Accordingly, no process can be viewed to be “closer” to the raw materials
than another one and the value added-gross production ratio can be retained as
a rather consistent indicator of vertical integration also in comparisons across
sectors. What is more, the coexistence of vertical and horizontal linkage spurs
the researcher to look for outsourcing measurements which are able to catch
the whole complexity of the input-output relations of an economic system. As
is well known, the concept of subsystem is an important reference point in this
last respect.
4.4 The weight of sectors in the relative subsystems
The concept of “subsystem” (sometimes also termed “vertically integrated sec-
tor”) is extremely useful when one wants to retain both direct and indirect
relations in an economic system.11
Following Momigliano and Siniscalco (1982a,b), the concept can be expressed
by referring to a matrix C in which each cell cij measures the share accounted
by sector i in the total labour required by subsystem j to produce the output
needed to satisfy the final demand. Indeed, C is defined as:
C = lˆB(l̂′B)−1 (2)
where l′ is the row vector of labour inputs, the hat symbol is used to denote
diagonalization and B is defined as:
B = qˆ−1(I−A)−1yˆ. (3)
In (3) qˆ is the diagonalized vector of gross production, A is the matrix of
technical coefficients calculated on the basis of domestic flows and yˆ is the
diagonalized vector of total final demand. Each row of B adds up to 1 and
shows “the shares of output of each branch which contribute to the different
subsystems” (Momigliano and Siniscalco, 1982b, p.156).12
11The genesis of vertical integration can be traced back to Adam Smith. However, starting
from the seminal notion of subsystem put forward by Sraffa (1960), it was only in the late 60s
that the concept of vertically integrated sector was analytically studied by, among the others,
Zaghini (1967) and Pasinetti (1973). Until the work of Momigliano and Siniscalco (1982b) the
concept was mainly utilized in empirical studies on productivity, as those by Gossling (1972)
and Gupta and Steedman (1971) and, more recently, by Milberg (1991).
12It has to be noted that the elements of C turn out to be invariant to changes in relative
prices as well as in final demand. The former property comes directly from the invariance to
11
Each cell cjj of the main diagonal of C tells us which is the weight of sector
j on the correspondent subsystem in terms of labour, that is: the proportion of
total labour, directly and indirectly needed to produce the output of a certain
sector j, accounted by sector j itself. Accordingly, cjj can be taken as an
important proxy of the vertical integration and disintegration of sector j. If this
sector were fully vertically integrated, i.e. if the production process turning non
produced inputs into final goods took place entirely within the sector itself, this
value would be equal to 1. Conversely, the closer the value of the main diagonal
cell is to 0, the more the correspondent sector will be vertically disintegrated,
the more outsourcing processes can be retained relevant for it.13
In a similar way, adding up, for each column j, the rows of the C matrix
which refer to business services,14 we obtain a measure of the integration de-
gree of the same services in the correspondent manufacturing subsystem j. And
also this indicator can provide us with important information in terms of out-
sourcing: the lower this sum, the less business services are integrated into the
relevant manufacturing subsystem, the more business services outsourcing are
presumable in place.
At this point we should remark that the cells of the C matrix can be taken
as indicators of what should be called “system” integration, i.e. the integra-
tion that arises from the whole set of input-output relations occurring in the
economic system. As it is determined by both technological and organizational
factors, and not only specific to the sector under consideration, this system
integration is different from that integration which is usually contrasted with
outsourcing. Indeed, the values of C are affected by the different labour pro-
ductivities and production techniques of the different sectors of an economy, as
well as by the organization of their production processes.15 Thus, changes over
time in the values of C cells actually reflect all of these changes.
However, it is also true that this temporal analysis also brings out the impact
of the reorganization of the production processes on the division of labour across
the sectors of the different filie`res: to the extent at which it reduces the relative
weight of a certain sector in the relative subsystem, outsourcing is thus one of
the production reorganizations signaled by C. Accordingly, firm’s integration
and system integration are strictly linked, though not coincident.
On the contrary, it can be proved that C is not affected by “intrasectoral
changes in relative prices of the B operator demonstrated by Rampa (1982). The latter, noted
by us, results from the fact that each element in C works out sectoral shares in subsystems;
thus, assuming constant returns to scale, shares are not affected by scale. Indeed, the generic
element cij of C can be expressed as follows:
cij =
hiαijyj∑n
i=1 hiαijyj
=
hiαij∑n
i=1 hiαij
where hi, yj and αij stand for, respectively, the labour input coefficient of sector i, the final
demand of j and the generic element of the Leontief inverse matrix.
13Although not explicitly considered in the above cited works, the elements in the main
diagonal of C was used by Momigliano and Siniscalco (1984) in a subsequent work to measure
the “error” standard sectoral analysis makes as it studies sectors in “relative isolation”.
14The weight of business sector services in each subsystem j is then measured by
∑m
i=n cij ,
where cij is the generic element of the matrix C, and the rows from n to m correspond to the
business services sectors of the same matrix.
15Keeping labour input coefficients constant, if the technical coefficient matrix is not decom-
posable, that is, if it cannot be reduced through elementary operations to a block triangular
matrix, an increase in service expenditure in whatever sector causes an increase in the weight
of services in each subsystem.
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outsourcing” phenomena (Appendix A contains the formal proof). Thus, the
analysis of the changes over time in C cells does not point out organizational
changes that occur entirely inside the sector itself, without involving across
sectors reorganizations. E.g., if establishments classified in textiles external-
ize some activities to establishments belonging to the same sector, this change
cannot be detected by changes in the values of C, at least keeping the level of
aggregation unaltered.
With this caveat in mind, the C matrix based indicators can be used as
first, possibly rough, signals of outsourcing processes. It should be noted that,
although absent in previous works on the issue (Momigliano and Siniscalco,
1982a,b), the indexes related to subsystems can be built up by using not only
domestic flows, but also total flows (domestic plus imported). In a world that is
more and more integrated and pervaded by international outsourcing, it seems
actually hard to defend the choice of leaving out foreign intermediate inputs
in order to avoid the technical problems they entail. Indeed, when total input
coefficient matrices are utilized in computing subsystem values, the theoretical
meaning of the operation through which labour input coefficients are multiplied
by the Leontief inverse becomes less clear. However, they can still be used by
resorting to a more articulated interpretation of the deflation of the imported in-
put coefficient matrix (M), for example, following Rampa and Rampa (1982).16
Thus, instead of working out C as in Equation (2), it is possible to calculate
it as follows:
C = lˆ N(l̂′ N)−1 (4)
where:
N = qˆ−1 (I− (A+M))−1
As before, l is the vector of labour inputs, q is the vector of sectoral gross pro-
ductions, I is an identity matrix, A is the matrix of domestic inputs coefficients
and M is the matrix of imported inputs coefficients.17
Differently from Equation (2), in Equation (4) there is no reference to final
demand, but this is not important given the proved invariance of C to changes
in final demand.
4.5 Summing up
In closing the presentation of the outsourcing measurements for structural change
analysis, it is worthwhile stressing that these indicators (or better to say prox-
16As they argued: “If mij is an imported inputs technical coefficient and m¯
0
ij =
(p0mi) mij(p
0
j )
−1 is the associated expenditure coefficient at constant prices, the latter can
be written as (p0mi/p
0
i ) p
0
i mij(p
0
j )
−1. Thus m¯0ij can be seen as the quantity of domestic
input i needed to obtain the amount of imported input i necessary to produce a unit of j at
the terms of trade which prevail in the base year (p0mi/p
0
i )” (Rampa and Rampa, 1982, p.318,
our translation).
17By using the deflated M matrix in working out B as in Equation (3), and by pre-
multiplying it by lˆ, we obtain a matrix whose generic element can be seen, with respect
to the imported part, as the labour needed for a “special” kind of international exchange,
that is: the labour to produce the domestic commodities necessary to obtain the foreign ones
used in producing the relative (subsystem) final good. Foreign commodities which are in turn
obtained through an international exchange carried out at the import-export relative prices
of the base year. Furthermore, when the total flows transaction matrix is used, instead of the
domestic one, the invariance of C to relative price changes does not hold anymore, because
C turns out to be affected by changes in terms of trade, so that matrices at constant prices
should be used.
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Table 1: Expected variations of the sector/subsystem indicators in manufactur-
ing sector i
Event Level Indicators Expected
variation
Intersectoral disin-
tegration
Sector V Ai/Qi −∆
aii = /−∆
SERVi/Qi (service outsourcing) +∆
SERVi/LABRi (service outsourcing) +∆
Subsystem Vertical integration degree −∆
Business services integration (service
outsourcing)
+∆
Intrasectoral disin-
tegration
Sector V Ai/Qi −∆
aii +∆
SERVi/Qi −∆
SERVi/LABRi =
Subsystem Vertical integration degree =
Business services integration =
ies) are among them inherently diverse, and all affected by a certain degree of
inaccuracy. For this reason, they should be used, rather than alternatively, in a
complementary way, by retaining their different signaling power (Table 1).
In so doing, their limitations could be mutually overcome, such as for ex-
ample, when we compare the value-added/gross production ratio of Section 4.3
with the vertical integration degree of Section 4.4. On the one hand, while the
vertical integration degree, calculated as the sectoral labour share of a sector in
the relative subsystem, is not affected by phenomenona of disintegration that
occur entirely within the sector, the same does not hold true with respect to
the sectoral V A/Q ratio, which instead tends to decrease for what we termed
“intrasectoral outsourcing”. On the other hand, the vertical integration degree
of the sector is less influenced than the sectoral V A/Q ratio by those “market
power” factors which affect the translation of the different labour costs into
prices. Indeed, if a sector is quite far from a perfectly competitive model, firms
might impose a mark-up relatively high, and the sectoral V A/Q ratio tends to
rise. For these reasons, the two indicators should be used as complementary
rather than substitute. And a similar argument holds true with respect to the
other indicators, as we will show in the next section through an illustrative
empirical application.
5 An illustrative application to the OECD area
In order to illustrate the actual functioning of the outsourcing measurements
discussed in the previous section, we apply them in carrying out both a cross-
sectional and an inter-temporal analysis of the economic structure of some
OECD countries over the ’80s and the middle ’90s. More precisely, because
of data availability, we will refer to two different country sets: the OECD6,
made up of Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, UK and US, over the ’80s; the
OECD18, that includes Australia, Canada, Check Republic, Denmark, Spain,
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Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, UK and US, with respect to the middle ’90s (see Appendices
B and D).
Data availability also allows us to retain a sectoral disaggregation for man-
ufacturing (including construction) of 14 sectors for the OECD6 over the ’80s,
and of 17 sectors for the OECD18 in the middle ’90s (see Appendix E).18
At the outset, we stress that such an application is just intended to be
illustrative of the methodological pros and cons of the various indicators, rather
than explorative of the economic structure and structural change of the OECD
area.19 We also stress that, rather than following the presentation order of
the outsourcing measurements, the application starts by looking for the most
general traces of outsourcing, at the subsystem level, for then moving to more
specific insights at the sectoral level.
5.1 Searching for “system” traces of service outsourcing
To start with, although a rough measurement, cross-country average values of
the sectoral vertical integration degree and of the business services integration
provide some interesting insights about those sectors which are “structurally”
more disintegrated than others, and for which outsourcing could thus be more
relevant.
Across the 18 OECD countries considered in the middle ’90s, 5 are the
sectors in which, on average, extra-sectoral labour contributions (direct and in-
direct) are particularly relevant (Table 2).20 However, when the role of natural
resources intensity is discounted for, the number of the most disintegrated sec-
tors narrows to 3: basic metals, chemical and transport equipment subsystems,
for which, unlike the other two (i.e. food, beverages and tobacco, and coke,
petroleum, and nuclear fuel) no manufacturing or agricultural sector out of the
main diagonal plays a pivotal role.
Quite interestingly, these are also among the sectors in which production
services have the greatest average labour weight in the middle ’90s. More in
general, the two rankings are quite similar, supporting our tentative interpreta-
tion of a relationship between vertical disintegration and integration in business
services.21
Our structural analysis seems thus aligned with what other contributions find
through case-studies at the firm level, in particular for transport equipments and
chemicals (Domberger, 1998). As for basic metals, instead, the result is somehow
counterfactual, having in mind the relative “closeness” to raw materials of the
sector compared to the other manufacturing ones. However, the data show a
prominent role of horizontal linkages over the vertical ones for manufacturing,
18In the definition of business sector services we have followed OECD conventions (50–74
ISIC Rev.3) (see Appendix C). In order to avoid, as much as possible, distortions coming from
sectoral aggregation, calculations have been carried out at the maximum level of disaggrega-
tion, and then the results have been reaggregated as required.
19In this vein, the present application represents a selection of a more extended empirical
work carried out on the same area (Montresor and Vittucci Marzetti, 2006).
20In Table 2 sectors have been ranked by referring to total production input-output tables.
However, the ranking remains substantially unchanged when the reference is to domestic
production flows (the Spearman correlation index is as high as 0.941).
21The Spearman correlation index is 0.684 and becomes 0.798 when the two “resource
intensive” sectors previously analyzed are not considered.
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Table 2: Vertical disintegration and business services integration per industrial
subsystems - middle ’90s – cross-country average values
Industrial subsystems
Avg % values
Vertical
disintegration
Rank
Business
services
integration
Rank
Low vertical integration
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 9.9 1 35.8 1
Food products, beverages and tobacco 26.3 2 20.6 14
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semitrailers 35.1 3 28.4 4
Chemicals 35.4 4 35.3 2
Basic Metals 37.4 5 30.2 3
Middle vertical integration
Rubber and Plastics Products 44.2 6 25.7 7
Electrical machinery & Apparatus, nec 45.4 7 24.9 8
Office and computing machinery - Communication
equipment - Medical, precision and optical instru-
ments
46.9 8 27.6 5
Other non-metallic mineral products 48.5 9 26.3 6
Machinery and equipment, nec 49.4 10 23.4 10
Other transport equipment 49.6 11 21.2 13
Wood, products of wood and cork 50.2 12 18.2 16
High vertical integration
Manufacturing, nec; Recycling 52.2 13 19.4 15
Construction 52.4 14 21.4 11
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and Publishing 53.2 15 24.9 9
Fabricated metal products 54.2 16 21.3 12
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 64.6 17 17.8 17
Source: our calculation on OECD I-O Database and 60-Industries GGDC Database
along with a high integration of services in the basic metal subsystem, revealing
a process of great restructuring.
In searching for traces of “system” outsourcing, interesting results emerge
also in terms of cross-country structural comparisons and of structural change.
As for the former, Table 3 shows some interesting country peculiarities.22
Business services have a relatively lower integration in manufacturing in all
the transition economies considered, namely Czech Republic, Poland and Hun-
gary. Hungary, in particular, although the country in which in the 1990s there
was the largest increase in the service share, both in terms of value added and
labour, and where manufacturing labour productivity grew faster (see, for in-
stance, Landesmann, 2000), reveals the least integrated business services in man-
ufacturing: thus suggesting that the increase in the service sector was mainly
due to final services, whereas producer services still lag behind. At the opposite
extreme, the highest integration of business services in manufacturing is shown
22Also in this case, the analysis has been accomplished both with respect to total and do-
mestic flows input-output tables. The relative country ranking is quite similar (the Spearman
correlation index is 0.83).
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Table 3: Business services integration in the manufacturing subsystem - middle
’90s – Weight of business services on the manufacturing subsystem in terms of
hours worked
Country
Business services integration
Total flows Rank Domestic flows Rank
United Kingdom 29.1 1 26.6 2
Netherlands 29.0 2 25.9 4
France 28.9 3 26.4 3
Australia 26.9 4 24.2 6
United States 25.7 5 27.2 1
Canada 25.4 6 24.9 5
Norway 25.1 7 21.4 8
Spain 24.9 8 21.0 11
Korea 24.2 9 21.1 10
Finland 23.5 10 19.0 14
Italy 23.3 11 18.6 15
Japan 22.9 12 21.4 9
Germany 22.5 13 19.7 12
Czech Republic 21.8 14 19.4 13
Poland 21.4 15 17.4 16
Denmark 20.3 16 22.1 7
Greece 19.1 17 14.9 18
Hungary 15.2 18 16.1 17
Source: our calculation on OECD I-O Database and 60-Industries GGDC Database
by the UK, which underwent in the 1980s a deep process of economic restructur-
ing (see, for instance, Matthews and Gardiner, 2000). While the high positions
of Australia, the United States and Canada are also confirmed by other studies
(e.g. Domberger, 1998).23
Coming to the structural change implications, a first set of indications comes
from the analysis of the levels and patterns of change in the average degree
of both vertical integration and business services integration in manufacturing
subsystems.
At the outset, vertical disintegration at the subsystem level appears a quite
recent result in OECD manufacturing, of the middle ’80s, and indeed a switch
with respect to the early ’80s. Apart from transport equipment, all the 14
retained manufacturing sectors increased, rather than decreased, their average
vertical integration at the beginning of the ’80s (Figure 2). At that stage only
motor vehicles and other transport sectors in OECD6 seemed to have started
undergoing a process of vertical reorganization of labour, being it due to tech-
nological change or other causes, such as outsourcing. Moreover, unlike vertical
disintegration, the increase of the labour weight of services on manufacturing
subsystems was already occurring in the early ’80s (Figure 3).24 Combining the
23In passing, it is worthwhile observing that the country ranking we got in terms of busi-
ness services subsystem integration is substantially different from that obtained working with
value added and employment shares of business services in total economy. This suggests that
“simple” sectoral indicators of tertiarization could be misleading in interpreting more complex
cases of structural change (Montresor and Vittucci Marzetti, 2006).
24It should be noted that, keeping technical coefficients and production organization con-
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Figure 2: Vertical integration degree of OECD6 manufacturing – cross-country
average values: 1980-1990 – Weight of sectors on the relative subsystems (hours
worked) – total flows at constant prices
Figure 3: Business services integration in manufacturing subsystems in the
OECD6 – cross-country average values: 1980-1990 – Weight of business services
in manufacturing subsystems (hours worked) – total flows at constant prices
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(a) Vertical integration degree (b) Weight of business services
Figure 4: Total manufacturing: 1980-1990
two results, it seems that, although increasingly more important for manufac-
turing, in the early ’80s business services did not enter in it as substitute yet.
This has possibly occurred instead in the middle ’80s, as the vertical integra-
tion of business services in manufacturing further increased on average and was
accompanied, as we saw, by the vertical disintegration of the latter.
Interesting results also emerge by analyzing the changes intervened in the
individual countries.
By referring to the whole manufacturing (Figure 4), for example, one can
contrast UK with the US. Indeed, while the former reveals a remarkable increase
of the business services integration in manufacturing, the latter is the only
country in which the weight of services in manufacturing during the ’80s, rather
than increasing, decreased to an appreciable extent (-5.3%), thus hinting at a
possible different strategy of US manufacturing firms, which got more vertically
integrated.
As interesting are the peculiar patterns of change at the level of individual
subsystem. The analysis of transport equipment (Figure 5), for example, reveals
a notable disintegration in Japan over the whole period and far beyond the
others,25 thus confirming the outcomes of other studies at the firm level on the
restructuring of the Japanese sector (see, for instance, Womack et al., 1990).
stant, the weight of business services on manufacturing subsystems tends to growth over time
when, as it is generally assumed, the rate of growth of labour productivity in manufacturing
is greater than in services. Accordingly, service outsourcing only accelerates the pace of this
“natural” tendency.
25In 1990 the vertical integration degree of the Japanese transport equipment sector was
just 0.34, while in the United States it was nearly twice as much (0.65). Moreover, from the
early to the late ’80s the rate of change of the vertical integration degree of this sector was
-29.4%, while in the US it was positive and equal to 5.5%. The main findings get confirmed
when the vertical integration degree is calculated with respect to domestic, rather than total,
production flows.
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(a) Vertical integration degree (b) Weight of business services
Figure 5: Transport equipment: 1980-1990
5.2 Sectoral value added-gross production ratios: are they
reliable?
As we have argued in Section 4.3, although built up by using simple sectoral
data, the value added-gross production ratio should be regarded as an outsourc-
ing measurement which refers to the subsystem level. Accordingly, we should
expect a certain correlation between such a measurement and that applied in
the previous section.
In order to verify this expectation, we calculated the average sectoral value
added-gross production ratios over the ’90s across the same sectors and coun-
tries (OECD18) of the previous sections, worked out the relative cross-country
averages and ranked the sectors accordingly (Table 4) (see Appendix B for the
dataset description).
Such an operation has been done after having checked for an eventual bias
in the V A/Q ratio due to the sectoral proximity to raw materials. As the bias
did not turn out evident,26 we have then analysed the relation between the
average sectoral V A/Q ratios and the percentage labour share of the sectors in
the relative subsystems (Figure 6).
Quite interestingly, their correlation turns out to be as high as 0.862 and the
two rankings are quite similar, except for some sectors, in particular: textiles,
leather and footwear; other non-metallic mineral products; and construction
(Figure 6).
These and other outliers deserve a special attention, as they actually reveal
the different “disintegration” rational the two measures are able to capture.
First of all, as we said in Section 4.5, while the vertical integration degree does
not change because of phenomena of intrasectoral disintegration, the same does
not hold true with respect to the sectoral V A/Q ratio, which tends to decrease
when establishments belonging to a certain sector outsource to establishments
26E.g., basic metals has got a ratio equal to 0.261, while the ratios of fabricated metals
product and electrical & optical instruments sectors are equal to, respectively, 0.401 and
0.353. The coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel sector has the lowest V A/Q
ratio (0.202), though it is certainly one of the most structurally “closer” to raw materials
among the manufacturing sectors.
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Table 4: Average sectoral V A/Q ratios of OECD18 manufacturing sectors over
the ’90s – cross-country average values
Industrial sectors Avg V A/Qa
Vertical
integrationb
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.202 9.9
Basic Metals 0.261 37.4
Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.264 26.3
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semitrailers 0.268 35.1
Chemicals 0.332 35.4
Wood and products of wood and cork 0.349 50.2
Electrical and Optical instruments 0.353 46.4
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.361 64.6
Other transport equipment 0.363 49.6
Rubber and Plastics Products 0.368 44.2
Machinery and equipment, nec 0.376 49.4
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and Publishing 0.380 53.2
Manufacturing, nec; Recycling 0.400 52.2
Fabricated metal products 0.401 54.2
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.405 48.5
Construction 0.421 52.4
Source: our calculation on OECD I-O Database and 60-Industries GGDC Database
aAverage sectoral value added-gross production ratios 1990-2000
bWeight of sectors in the relative subsystems in terms of hours worked – Total flows
classified in the same sector. Apparently, this is what happened during the
1990s in the textile sector, where phenomena of “intrasectoral outsourcing”
were highly frequent. Although to a lesser extent, the same holds true also for
wood, wood products and cork; basic metals; and paper products, printing and
publishing. Quite interestingly, what emerge from the data can be related to
the recent technical changes occurred in these sectors, especially in the last two,
involving a reduction in their minimum efficient scale. We refer in particular to
the emergence of mini-mills in the steel production (e.g. Audretsch and Feldman,
1996) and to the massive computerization occurred in printing and publishing
in the last years (e.g. Domberger, 1998).
A different argument holds with respect to constructions, other non metallic
mineral products and rubber and plastics products, which appear less disinte-
grated in terms of V A/Q than what would be in terms of the relative sector-
subsystem ratio. As we pointed out in Section 4.5, this could be due to the
peculiar market structure of these sectors, of the first in particular, in which
monopolistic rents are quite diffuse and hinder the outsourcing revealing power
of the V A/Q ratio.
Although both the kinds of interpretations need to be confirmed with other
data, suffice here to notice how the two indicators of disintegration/integration
should be used in a complementary way to have a better understanding of the
investigated phenomenon.
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Figure 6: Sectoral V A/Q ratios vs vertical integration degrees
5.3 Service outsourcing: what input-output technical co-
efficients have to say?
The final point to address is how consistent the previous indicators of “system”
integration of business services into the production of manufactured goods are
with the more “direct” sector-based indicators of outsourcing we have presented
in Section 4, that is SERV/Q and SERV/LABR.
At the outset, let us observe that, once calculated for the OECD18 in the
middle ’90s, the rank correlation index between SERV/Q and SERV/LABR
is very low (0.31). And also the relative ranking shows how SERV/LABR does
not turn out very reliable in cross-country comparisons, as possibly affected
quite a lot by the relative cost of labour (Table 5).
Second, the ranking made according to SERV/Q is not consistent with the
results we have previously obtained at the subsystem level (see Table 3),27 thus
suggesting how these sectoral indicators should be retained measures of changes
in service outsourcing practices at the sectoral level over time, with differences
and some degree of complementarity with respect to the ones analysed at the
subsystem level. The replication of the analysis carried out in Section 5.1 for
manufacturing as a whole and for transport equipment can be of some help in
illustrating this point (Figures 7 and 8).
Quite interestingly, as far as the European countries are concerned, the two
data series are quite consistent between them and decisively supportive of the
outsourcing hypothesis. Indeed, these countries show significant increases in
both the variables over the whole period. In particular, the data provide further
evidence on the economic restructuring of the UK manufacturing during the
’80s, and especially in the last five years.28 However, it has to be noted that the
27The correlation indexes, both linear and rank, between SERV/Q in manufacturing and
the business services integration in manufacturing subsystem are definitively quite low. The
linear correlation is 0.42, while the rank one is even lower and equal to 0.325. As for
SERV/LABR, its rank correlation with the indicator at the subsystem level is as low as
0.063, while the correspondent linear correlation is nearly null (-0.013).
28For manufacturing as a whole, for example, SERV/Q increased more than 66%, while
SERV/LABR of 60.6%.
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Table 5: Business services expenditure per production unit (SERV/Q) and on
labour compensation (SERV/LABR) in manufacturing in middle 90s
Country SERV/Q Rank SERV/LABR Rank
United Kingdom 0.186 1 0.752 9
France 0.183 2 0.855 4
Denmark 0.183 3 0.721 15
Norway 0.178 4 0.829 6
Germany 0.177 5 0.624 17
Japan 0.177 6 0.775 8
Australia 0.176 7 0.986 2
Poland 0.171 8 1.128 1
United States 0.168 9 0.752 10
Italy 0.158 10 0.840 5
Netherlands 0.152 11 0.751 11
Spain 0.152 12 0.750 12
Czech Republic 0.139 13 0.986 3
Finland 0.128 14 0.667 16
Greece 0.127 15 0.788 7
Canada 0.121 16 0.593 18
Hungary 0.115 17 0.737 13
Korea 0.111 18 0.728 14
Source: our calculation on OECD I-O Database and 60-Industries GGDC Database
integration of business services in UK manufacturing is largely underestimated
by the two indicators of the present section, both in terms of levels and of rates
of changes, as it clearly emerges comparing Figures 4-5 with Figures 7-8. This
suggests how considering both direct and indirect intersectoral relationships
matters in dealing with outsourcing as much as with other processes of economic
restructuring.
Apart from Canada and US, where data do not show significant tenden-
cies towards service outsourcing29 (the only exception is represented by the US
transport equipment sector in the late ’80s) a special attention should be paid
to the case of Japan, and of the Japanese transport equipment sector in par-
ticular, for which the data seem to be somehow inconsistent. Indeed, as we
saw in Section 5.1, during the ’80s the growth rate of business services integra-
tion in the transport equipment subsystem was of 30.8%, and accompanied by
a related process of sectoral disintegration (-29.4%), thus clearly signalling an
intense process of economic restructuring within the subsystem. This fact gets
somehow confirmed by the data on SERV/LABR: for transport equipments,
the overall growth rate of the indicator for the ’80s was nearly 25%, although
this increase mainly occurred in the last five years.30
29In the United States during the ’80s the overall rate of change of SERV/Q for the whole
manufacturing is negative and equal to -5.2%, whereas the rate of change of SERV/LABR,
though positive, is relatively small (6.9%).
30At the same time, the indicator increased a lot also for machinery & equipment (+35.4%),
the main supplier sector of transport equipment. As for basic metals and fabricated metals
products, the other two manufacturing sectors with relevant labour share in the transport
equipment subsystem, the rates of change of SERV/LABR were, respectively, 24.1% and
-2.9%. Furthermore, looking at the average levels of the indicators in the two sectors, Japan
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(a) Total Manufacturing (b) Transport Equipment
Figure 7: Intermediate business services expenditure per production unit (con-
stant prices): 1980-1990
(a) Total Manufacturing (b) Transport Equipment
Figure 8: Intermediate business services expenditure on labour compensation
(current prices): 1980-1990
However, the same pattern is not revealed by the data on SERV/Q. Indeed,
unlike for the other countries, in the Japanese sector there was no significant
increase in business services expenditure per production unit during the 1980s
(see Figure 7(b)), and the same does hold true also for its traditional sup-
plier sectors, that is, machinery & equipment, basic metals, rubber and plastics
products and other fabricated metal products.31 In synthesis, it seems that the
shows the highest values.
31Although sectoral input flows at constant prices from business services increased more
than 89.8%, the overall increase in sectoral gross production was 95.6%, thus determining
a reduction in the coefficients of -2.94%. Looking at the Japanese data on SERV/Q for
machinery & equipment; basic metals; rubber and plastics products; and other fabricated
metal products, the overall rates of change for the 1980s were, respectively, −11.5%, 9.9%,
−16.6%, −2.6%. (With respect to the same period, in the UK the rates of change in the
corresponding sectors were 40.9%, -23.1%, 70.9% and 43.6%.) In addition, examining the
average level of SERV/Q over the ’80s, rather than its change rates, it turns out that it is
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(a) Japan
(b) United Kingdom
Figure 9: Technical coefficients in transport equipment (constant prices)
Japanese economic restructuring, while reflected in the changes occurred in the
employment structure, does not result from the data on intermediate service
consumptions per production unit.
A tentative explanation of this apparent inconsistency can be found by re-
calling the relationship between intrasectoral outsourcing and sectoral input-
output coefficients we have pointed out in Section 4.2. In such a case, as we
said, SERV/Q would tend to decrease in the outsourcing sector i, whereas,
ceteris paribus, neither its SERV/LABR nor the indicators at the subsystem
level would be affected. What is more, all the technical coefficients of the same
sector (aij) would tend to decrease, with the exception of the autocoefficients
(aii), which, on the contrary, would increase.
In order to ascertain whether this was the case for the Japanese transport
equipment sector, we have compared levels and changes of its technical coeffi-
cients with the ones experienced by the same sector in the other countries of
particularly small for transport equipment in Japan.
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our dataset. The results seem to support our interpretation. Indeed, over the
’80s the autocoefficients of the transport equipment sector in Japan increased by
70.9%, while, among the remaining five countries of the OECD6 set, the largest
increase occurred in the UK and it was of just 32.9%.32 (Figure 9 shows the
technical coefficients of the sector in Japan and UK over the 1980s.) At the same
time, in the Japanese transport equipment sector, all the remaining technical
coefficients decreased. Among these, we have to notice the changes occurred in
the coefficients referred to basic metals, machinery & equipment and fabricated
metal products, three of the most important and complementary inputs in the
production of transport equipment.33
Evidences of a certain intrasectoral disintegration of the Japanese transport
equipment sector are therefore apparent. This interpretation is consistent with
the data on employees per establishment in the automobile industry. Indeed,
in the late 1980s Japan had the lowest number of employees per establishment
among the top five economies in the World at that time (Williams et al., 1998,
p.25). However, other factors might have played a role in explaining the incon-
sistency we have detected. First of all, the particular features of the Japanese
manufacturing, and of transport equipment in particular, sometimes pointed out
in empirical studies (e.g. Domberger, 1998), might have led to underestimate
the service inputs of manufacturing sectors. Indeed, given the particular organi-
zational relationships of the Japanese industrial structure (of which “keiretsu”
are the most notable example), input prices might be more similar to intra-firm
“transfer prices” rather than normally negotiated “market prices” (see, for in-
stance, Jarillo, 1993). Second, the large labour productivity gains reached in
the transport equipment during the ’80s in Japan, not accompanied by an equal
increase of labour productivity in the service sectors, might have caused an in-
crease in the service labour share of the transport equipment subsystem. Thus,
the observed changes in the sectoral labour shares might have been also due
to the different growth rates of sectoral productivity. However, although more
than plausible, all these interpretations turn out to be complementary, rather
than primary, with respect to the particular disintegration hypothesis we have
put forward.
6 Conclusive remarks
Although mainly investigated as a process of organizational change, in partic-
ular of the firm boundaries, outsourcing has important implications also for
the structure of the economic system in which the “outsourcee” and the “out-
sourcer” firms operate. The organizational and structural changes outsourcing
determines are thus nothing but two coins of the same medal.
32It is worth noting that the increase of aii we have registered in Japan is not due to
changes in the composition of the sector. Also by increasing the level of disaggregation, the
basic insights get confirmed. Indeed, the growth rate of motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailer
in Japan was of 52.7%, whereas in the UK it was of just 12.9%.
33Over the ’80s, in all the countries but Japan the reduction in the coefficients of basic
metals was accompanied by an increase for machinery & equipment and fabricated metal
products. On the contrary, in Japan they all decreased: -31.4% for basic metals, -37.3% for
machinery & equipment and -22.7% for fabricated metal products. One might argue that
these results, rather than by disintegration, are mainly due to technical progress. However, if
it was so, how to explain the marked increase of the autocoefficients? Technical change might
not be the only explanation.
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In bridging the micro and the macro-analysis of outsourcing - an effort so far
successful only in international trade studies (for a survey see Spencer, 2005)
- this paper illustrates, compares and applies a “battery” of an input-output
kind of outsourcing indicators. That is, indicators which help in disentangling
to which extent and in which way the different externalisation decisions of the
firms turn into changes of the intersectoral and intrasectoral relationships of
the economic system in which they operate. In other words, a set of indicators
through which outsourcing, especially of producer services, can be accounted for
in explaining structural change along with other more “popular” determinants
of it, such as technical, production and demand-led changes.
Given that the different structural change determinants of one economy are
at work simultaneously, an accurate analysis and interpretation of the indicators
we discuss should be accompanied by a suitable decomposition of their relative
weight. Indeed, some decomposition techniques have been recently put forward
for this scope (e.g. Dietrich, 1999; McCarthy and Anagnostou, 2004). However,
their construction and interpretation appears to us still problematic and requires
further research effort. Accordingly, we decided to place this issue on our future
research agenda. In this paper we have instead opted to: on the one hand,
discuss the rational of the same indicators, on the other hand, to carry out
their empirical application just by alerting about the need of controlling for
extra-outsourcing determinants when necessary.
The discussion of the rational of the outsourcing indicators we present leads
us to a first important result. Although they are all affected by the external-
isation decisions of the correspondent firms, and thus inform about it, their
interpretative power differs: either because they retain total (at the subsystem
level) rather than direct (at the sectoral level) outsourcing effects, or because
they are able rather than unable to distinguish inter-sectoral from intra-sectoral
outsourcing, or because they are affected rather than unaffected by the market
structure of the relevant sector, just to mention a few differentiating mecha-
nisms. Accordingly, the indicators of outsourcing of the paper should be used
as complementary rather than as substitute among them, while looking for the
“best”, or the “most revealing” one could be misleading.
The illustrative empirical application we carried out with respect to a set of
OECD countries over the ’80s and the middle ’90s corroborates this suggestion.
Some results confirm, on a comparable and systematic basis, what previous
work had already suggested on the basis of case-studies and/or nation specific
analyses, such as, for example, the idiosyncratic resort to service outsourcing,
both in terms of levels and of growth rates, of the UK manufacturing sectors.
Some of the results we got are instead quite original, as they have been obtained
by working on a new OECD dataset, covering updated input-output tables for
a larger set of countries than the “old” one, and by crossing it with other
newly available sources of sectoral data (e.g., the 60-Industry Database of the
Groningen Growth and Development Centre). The evidence we obtained for the
former socialist European countries, usually retained to have been invested by
a massive tertiarization process over the 1990s, but here characterized by the
lowest degree of integration of business services in manufacturing subsystems,
is one of the most relevant of these results. Finally, some of the outcomes that
we got turn out to be inconsistent or mixed-up, as different indicators point to,
at least apparently, different predictions in terms of outsourcing: the case of the
Japanese transport equipment sector is for sure the most representative of them.
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On the other hand, an accurate complementary use of the different outsourcing
indicators we have discussed turns out to be helpful in solving these apparent
contradictions and in eliminating the inherent biases by which some of them are
affected. In the Japanese case, for example, a closer look at the technical input-
output coefficients of transport equipment sheds some light on the hypothesis of
an intrasectoral, rather than intersectoral, disintegration process over the ’80s
and the middle ’90s.
In closing the paper, it seems to us that, although in the need of controlling
for other factors, the indicators we have presented could be used as comple-
mentary (and possibly rough) proxies of a structural change determinant which
should be extrapolated from the “black-box” of other important economic pro-
cesses.
Appendix A Intrasectoral outsourcing and i-o
indicators. A formal treatment
As argued in Section 4.2, intrasectoral outsourcing in a certain sector j entails
a change of the intrasectoral flows (wjj) by a certain amount (dj) and a corre-
spondent change in the sectoral gross production (Qj) by the same amount.
Denoting with dˆ the diagonalized vector of the sectoral changes dj , the
matrix of input-output technical coefficients (A), formally defined in Equation
(1), therefore changes as follows:
Ad = (W + dˆ)(qˆ+ dˆ)−1 =

w11+d1
Q1+d1
. . . w1nQn+dn
...
. . .
...
wn1
Q1+d1
. . . wnn+dnQn+dn

Given that 0 ≤ wij < Qj , it follows that:
wjj + dj
Qj + dj
{
>
wjj
Qj
if dj > 0
<
wjj
Qj
if dj < 0
and
wij
Qj + dj
{
<
wij
Qj
if dj > 0
>
wij
Qj
if dj < 0
Thus, an increase (decrease) in the value of the duplication in sector j, be-
cause of an increased (decreased) intrasectoral disintegration within the sector,
dj > 0 (dj < 0), will cause, ceteris paribus, an increase (decrease) of the relevant
autocoefficient (ajj) and a decrease (increase) in all the remaining coefficients
(aij with i 6= j).
Moreover, given that the value added is not affected by duplication and in-
trasectoral outsourcing does not entail any reorganization of production among
sectors, the sectoral value added remains unchanged. Thus, we have that:
V Aj
Qj + dj
{
<
V Aj
Qj
if dj > 0
>
V Aj
Qj
if dj < 0
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Hence, ceteris paribus, the sectoral value added/gross production ratio tends to
decrease for phenomena of intrasectoral outsourcing.
Let us also note that, given a non-service sector i, if its intrasectoral disin-
tegration increases, this will cause, ceteris paribus, a reduction in SERVi/Qi,
SERVi/LABRi, defined in Section 4.1, will not change.
Finally, it remains to prove that intrasectoral outsourcing cannot alter any
of the indicators at the subsystem level discussed in Section 4.4, namely vertical
integration degree and business services integration. In order to do so, let us
prove the following equality:
qˆ−1(I−W qˆ−1)−1 = (qˆ+ dˆ)−1
(
I− (W + dˆ)(qˆ+ dˆ)−1
)−1
(5)
Inverting both sides of the equality and recalling that (M1M2)−1 =M−12 M
−1
1 ,
where M1 and M2 are two generic conformable square matrices, we obtain:
(
qˆ−1(I−W qˆ−1)−1)−1 = ((qˆ+ dˆ)−1 (I− (W + dˆ)(qˆ+ dˆ)−1)−1)−1
(I−W qˆ−1) qˆ =
(
I− (W + dˆ)(qˆ+ dˆ)−1
)
(qˆ+ dˆ)
qˆ−W = (qˆ+ dˆ)− (W + dˆ)
0 = 0
that demonstrates the previous equality.
From Equation (5) it follows that:
B = qˆ−1(I−A)−1yˆ = (qˆ+ dˆ)−1
(
I− (W + dˆ)(qˆ+ dˆ)−1
)−1
yˆ (6)
Thus, intrasectoral disintegration phenomenona do not alter the operator
B and the other matrix defined at the subsystem level, C. Accordingly, the
indicators based on this matrix are not affected by intrasectoral outsourcing.
Appendix B Dataset description
Data have been obtained from different datasets. Input-output tables come
from both the new input-output dataset, recently built up by the OECD (2005)
and the “old” STAN input-output database for the ’80s (OECD, 1995).
Sectoral data on total hours worked have been obtained from the 60-Industry
Database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC, 2005).
The data on sectoral gross production and value added over the ’90s used
for calculating the average sectoral ratios in the analyses carried out in Section
4.3 come from the OECD STAN database (OECD, 2004). Because of missing
data, in this specific application we have excluded Australia from the average
ratio of the construction sector. Furthermore, when for some country some of
the needed disaggregated data were missing, we used the least aggregated data
available assuming that, for that country, the proportion between the disag-
gregated data and the more aggregated ones is the same as that between the
correspondent average values. This procedure has been applied to the follow-
ing missing values: Chemicals and chemical products (Cod. 24) and Rubber
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and plastics products (Cod. 25) for Norway, using the data of Chemical, rub-
ber, plastics and fuel products (Cod. 23-25); Basic Metals (27) and Fabricated
metal products (28) for Australia and Czech Republic, using the data of Ba-
sic metals and fabricated metal products (27-28); Motor vehicles, trailers and
semi-trailers (34) and Other transport equipment (35) for Czech Republic, us-
ing the data on Transport equipment (34-35). The ensuing results are quite
robust and do not change significantly if some other method is adopted, such
as, for instance, simply calculating the sectoral averages without the sectors of
the countries for which the data are missing.
Appendix C Business sector services
Sector ISIC Rev.3 Codes
Wholesale and retail trade; repairs 50-52
Hotels and restaurants 55
Transport and storage 60-63
Post and telecommunications 64
Financial intermediation 65-67
Real estate, renting and business activities 70-74
Appendix D Country coverage
Country Input-Output Tables
early ’80s* mid-’80s* early ’90s* mid-’90s
Australia 1995
Canada 1981 1986 1990 1997
Czech Republic 1995
Denmark 1980 1985 1990 1997
Finland 1995
France 1980 1985 1990 1995
Germany 1995
Greece 1994
Hungary 1998
Italy 1992
Japan 1980 1985 1990 1995
Korea 1995
Netherlands 1995
Norway 1997
Poland 1995
Spain 1995
United Kingdom 1979 1984 1990 1998
United States 1982 1985 1990 1997
*Input-output tables at constant prices
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Appendix E Sector classification
Sector ISIC Rev.3 Codes
Food products, beverages and tobacco 15-16
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 17-19
Wood and products of wood and cork 20
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 21-22
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23
Chemicals (including pharmaceuticals) 24
Rubber and plastics Products 25
Other non-metallic mineral products 26
Basic metals 27
Fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment) 28
Machinery & equipment
...Machinery and equipment, nec 29
...Office and computing machinery - communication equipment - medical,
precision and optical instruments
30,32-33
...Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 31
Transport equipment
...Motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers 34
...Other transport equipment 35
Manufacturing, nec; recycling 36-37
Construction 45
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